From No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice by David Sklansky and Ed Miller.
Concept No. 46: Don't just think about what you put your opponents on. Think about what they put you on also.
Yeah, this is what I'm always talking about. You need to think about what your range is and what your opponent's range is. That is the basis of game theory.
Concept No. 47: If it's clear your opponent has a hand at least worth a call, but he raises instead, it's almost never a bluff.
I think this is an overstatement to the extent that it is misleading. Also, it is very difficult to tell when your opponent has a hand "at least worth a call." However, this does occasionally arise if your opponent played in a way that was probably a made hand but if not, must have been a draw. If the draw comes in, you might want to bet to get value from his previously-made hands, but you'll have to fold if he raises. I would argue that your opponent could still be bluffing in this situation, but it's unlikely enough that you should usually still fold.
Suppose that you identified a situation where your opponent certainly had a hand that was at least worth a call, and he has raised you. Sklansky and Miller say it is almost never a bluff. However, it could still be a bluff if your opponent is overly aggressive. He would likely be making a mistake, but mistakes like this are not that rare. Moreover, if he knows you will fold to this bluff (which S+M are recommending to you), it means his bluff was actually the correct play after all.
This last idea is a bit convoluted, but I have used this against my more astute opponents. For example, I played a hand that went something like this: suppose you have AsJh and the board comes Jd 5s 4s. There is a lot of action on the flop. The turn is the Ace of clubs and you get check-raised. I think you are probably behind here, but you might still want to call because you might be ahead, and you do have four outs against a small set. If the river is a spade and your opponent bets, you can raise as a bluff. Your opponent will figure you would only do this with a flush, and fold his set. He might even fold a small flush or straight.
Monday, December 07, 2009
Friday, December 04, 2009
Analyzing NLHE:TAP Concept 45
After this post, I'll be three-quarters of the way through the concepts at the end of No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice by David Sklansky and Ed Miller.
Concept No. 45: Know when a hand (even a good one) has more value as a bluff catcher.
This is good advice (after all, it's always good to know things), but the Sklansky and Miller don't give a good explanation of how to identify this type of situation.
The authors merely point out that sometimes you should check with your good hands, especially if you think it's likely that your opponent has a hand that's too weak to call with. This is true, but it's a meager assessment of the circumstances that make it profitable to check-call with good hands rather than to value bet with them. It would be helpful to discuss these circumstances.
For one thing, we need to consider our opponent's style. As I summed up in my analysis of Concept 10, if you've identified any weakness in your opponent's play, try to put him in situations that will allow you to exploit this. There are two types of mistakes your opponents might make that would turn some of your strong hand into bluff-catchers.
The most common weakness that you will be able to exploit is if your opponent bluffs too often. Against such opponents, you should be much more willing to check with your strong hands and use them as bluff-catchers. Another type of opponent is so tight that he will not pay you off if you bet. These players are great to bluff against, but if you hold a strong hand, you want to get him to put more money in the pot. So, it may be better to just check and call against extremely tight players. Often very tight players will be very passive, though, so this opportunity seldom arises.
There are also circumstances that have nothing to do with your opponents weaknesses that can make many of your hands bluff-catchers. Generally, this will occur if your opponent likely knows whether he has your hand beaten. This can happen if your hand-range is extremely narrow (usually because of the type of board and the betting to this point, or maybe you accidentally exposed your cards), or if your opponent's range is polarized (that is, he probably holds either a very strong hand or a very weak one). In such a situation, your only viable options are to check or to put in a small blocking bet. Let's look at some situations where your opponents range might be polarized.
In my discussion of Concept 44, I noted that when your opponent's hand range becomes polarized when he bets on the river: either he has a reasonably strong hand or he is bluffing. If you hold a hand in between these ranges, it doesn't matter much exactly what you hold; all that matters is your opponent's bluffing frequency. If he bluffs too much, all of your hands in this middle range are good to call with. If he bluffs too little, they should all be folded (or, possibly, raised as a bluff).
Another common situation where your opponent's range is polarized is if he is very likely to have had a drawing hand, but you're not sure if he has hit his draw on the river. Your opponent knows if he has you beaten because his hand is polarized. Either he hit his draw or he didn't. Unless you can beat your opponent even if he hit his draw, your hands now turn into bluff-catchers.
There are other probably other situations where your hands might be best used as "bluff-catchers," but these are the most common ones I can think of.
Concept No. 45: Know when a hand (even a good one) has more value as a bluff catcher.
This is good advice (after all, it's always good to know things), but the Sklansky and Miller don't give a good explanation of how to identify this type of situation.
The authors merely point out that sometimes you should check with your good hands, especially if you think it's likely that your opponent has a hand that's too weak to call with. This is true, but it's a meager assessment of the circumstances that make it profitable to check-call with good hands rather than to value bet with them. It would be helpful to discuss these circumstances.
For one thing, we need to consider our opponent's style. As I summed up in my analysis of Concept 10, if you've identified any weakness in your opponent's play, try to put him in situations that will allow you to exploit this. There are two types of mistakes your opponents might make that would turn some of your strong hand into bluff-catchers.
The most common weakness that you will be able to exploit is if your opponent bluffs too often. Against such opponents, you should be much more willing to check with your strong hands and use them as bluff-catchers. Another type of opponent is so tight that he will not pay you off if you bet. These players are great to bluff against, but if you hold a strong hand, you want to get him to put more money in the pot. So, it may be better to just check and call against extremely tight players. Often very tight players will be very passive, though, so this opportunity seldom arises.
There are also circumstances that have nothing to do with your opponents weaknesses that can make many of your hands bluff-catchers. Generally, this will occur if your opponent likely knows whether he has your hand beaten. This can happen if your hand-range is extremely narrow (usually because of the type of board and the betting to this point, or maybe you accidentally exposed your cards), or if your opponent's range is polarized (that is, he probably holds either a very strong hand or a very weak one). In such a situation, your only viable options are to check or to put in a small blocking bet. Let's look at some situations where your opponents range might be polarized.
In my discussion of Concept 44, I noted that when your opponent's hand range becomes polarized when he bets on the river: either he has a reasonably strong hand or he is bluffing. If you hold a hand in between these ranges, it doesn't matter much exactly what you hold; all that matters is your opponent's bluffing frequency. If he bluffs too much, all of your hands in this middle range are good to call with. If he bluffs too little, they should all be folded (or, possibly, raised as a bluff).
Another common situation where your opponent's range is polarized is if he is very likely to have had a drawing hand, but you're not sure if he has hit his draw on the river. Your opponent knows if he has you beaten because his hand is polarized. Either he hit his draw or he didn't. Unless you can beat your opponent even if he hit his draw, your hands now turn into bluff-catchers.
There are other probably other situations where your hands might be best used as "bluff-catchers," but these are the most common ones I can think of.
Thursday, December 03, 2009
Diane's Final Hand at the Bike?
There have been some complaints that I have been focusing too much on my poker analyses recently and have neglected telling stories about my experiences at the poker tables. So, here's something that happened last night.
In the 5-10 blind $500+ buyin NL game, I was on the button and somebody straddled for $20 (he gets last action, like another big blind). One player limped, and Diane, to my right, raised to $85. Diane is an attractive Asian woman who prides herself on her ability to loosen up a table, encouraging people to gamble with weak hands. Just a few hands earlier, she had executed a successful bluff with a $250 flop bet followed by a $800 turn bet with ten-high, no draw. She had about $5000 in play.
I had about $900 and looked down at AKo, much better than what Diane was likely playing with. I raised to $275.
To my left (in the small blind) was one of the tightest NL players I've played with. He had about $2700 and called my $275 raise. Everyone folded to Diane, who raised to $1000, putting me all-in. I have to call about $625 more. I need about 30% equity to make the call correct. I call. Even against KK I have enough equity here. I'm hoping the tight player to my left will fold, or that he'll push all-in and make Diane fold (in which case there will be more money for me to win, and I'll only need to win 23% of the time).
While the player to my left was deciding what to do, Diane asked me if she could look at my cards. I smiled at her incredulously and shook my head no. She hadn't bothered to wait for my reply, though, and looked at my cards.
The player who had been in the big blind was quite upset by this, and the floorman was called over. It's rather unusual for a player who isn't directly involved in a situation to call the floorman, and some of the other players (most notably Diane and "Corporation" Mike) were quite upset with this guy. However, as the guy said, "I'm not going to just sit here if I see something fishy going on at the table! I'm supposed to just sit back and watch cheating going on?" I'm sure Diane didn't mean to cheat, but I still think it was right for this guy to call the floorman.
Anyway, I think you can see where this is going. The floorman misunderstood the first explanation and said "well, I can't kill her hand just because someone showed his hand to her!" Of course, she had taken it upon herself to look at my hand. Diane started shouting about how this wasn't fair and if they decided to kill her hand, she would never come back to the Bike. The floorman called over the floor supervisor, who, amidst a growing crowd of onlookers, took about two minutes to finally call Diane's hand dead. Her $1000 stayed in the pot. On the verge of tears, Diane left, loudly cursing the floormen and explaining that this is why nobody comes to the Bike anymore.
In my opinion, this was a relatively clear decision for the floormen. Although Diane was not trying to cheat, she did break the rules and give herself an unfair advantage. Technically, her hand would be dead even if she were also all-in already (even though looking at my cards would give her no advantage because she would have had no more decisions to make). However, it's unfortunate to lose a friendly player who was generally very good for the game.
With Diane's hand out of the way and her money in the pot, the tight player made an easy call with QQ and won the whole pot.
In the 5-10 blind $500+ buyin NL game, I was on the button and somebody straddled for $20 (he gets last action, like another big blind). One player limped, and Diane, to my right, raised to $85. Diane is an attractive Asian woman who prides herself on her ability to loosen up a table, encouraging people to gamble with weak hands. Just a few hands earlier, she had executed a successful bluff with a $250 flop bet followed by a $800 turn bet with ten-high, no draw. She had about $5000 in play.
I had about $900 and looked down at AKo, much better than what Diane was likely playing with. I raised to $275.
To my left (in the small blind) was one of the tightest NL players I've played with. He had about $2700 and called my $275 raise. Everyone folded to Diane, who raised to $1000, putting me all-in. I have to call about $625 more. I need about 30% equity to make the call correct. I call. Even against KK I have enough equity here. I'm hoping the tight player to my left will fold, or that he'll push all-in and make Diane fold (in which case there will be more money for me to win, and I'll only need to win 23% of the time).
While the player to my left was deciding what to do, Diane asked me if she could look at my cards. I smiled at her incredulously and shook my head no. She hadn't bothered to wait for my reply, though, and looked at my cards.
The player who had been in the big blind was quite upset by this, and the floorman was called over. It's rather unusual for a player who isn't directly involved in a situation to call the floorman, and some of the other players (most notably Diane and "Corporation" Mike) were quite upset with this guy. However, as the guy said, "I'm not going to just sit here if I see something fishy going on at the table! I'm supposed to just sit back and watch cheating going on?" I'm sure Diane didn't mean to cheat, but I still think it was right for this guy to call the floorman.
Anyway, I think you can see where this is going. The floorman misunderstood the first explanation and said "well, I can't kill her hand just because someone showed his hand to her!" Of course, she had taken it upon herself to look at my hand. Diane started shouting about how this wasn't fair and if they decided to kill her hand, she would never come back to the Bike. The floorman called over the floor supervisor, who, amidst a growing crowd of onlookers, took about two minutes to finally call Diane's hand dead. Her $1000 stayed in the pot. On the verge of tears, Diane left, loudly cursing the floormen and explaining that this is why nobody comes to the Bike anymore.
In my opinion, this was a relatively clear decision for the floormen. Although Diane was not trying to cheat, she did break the rules and give herself an unfair advantage. Technically, her hand would be dead even if she were also all-in already (even though looking at my cards would give her no advantage because she would have had no more decisions to make). However, it's unfortunate to lose a friendly player who was generally very good for the game.
With Diane's hand out of the way and her money in the pot, the tight player made an easy call with QQ and won the whole pot.
Sunday, November 29, 2009
Analyzing NLHE:TAP Concepts 42-44
From No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice by David Sklansky and Ed Miller.
Concept No. 42: If you check the river, most players will bet only with very good hands and with bluffs. They'll check down hands that could win a showdown, but that are unlikely to be called by worse hands.
Yup. This is the correct way for your opponents to play the river, and since it's rather basic and intuitive, most players have mastered this strategy. You will see players deviate from this, but it is quite rare. However, I think it is worth noting because you don't want to fall into a pattern where you pay off your opponents if they make huge bets with hands that are only moderately strong.
As Sklansky and Malmuth point out in their discussion, this fact means that a lot of your medium-strength hands become "bluff-catchers." That is, they can only win if your opponent is bluffing. For example, it doesn't matter whether you hold top pair or bottom pair if your opponent will only value bet with two pair or better. Both hands can beat only bluffs. As S+M point out in Concept 44 (which I analyze below), the bigger your opponent's river bet, the less your hand matters; for example, if your opponent is rational and makes a bet of ten times the size of the pot, a wide range of your hands become "bluff-catchers," since your opponent will probably either have the nuts or nothing. On the other hand, if your opponent bets only one-tenth of the pot, the strength of your hand is very relevant.
Concept No. 43: Big bets mean big hands. Don't make or call big bets very often with weak hands.
As uncontroversial as this concept seems, I don't think it's precisely right. Big bets can mean not only big hands; they can also mean big draws or hands worried about draws. When your opponent makes a big bet (or when you make a big bet and get called), his hand range becomes much stronger. Thus, you should only call or make big bets with hands that have the potential to beat your opponent's strong range. This means you should be calling or making big bets only with big hands or big draws.
We can look back at some earlier concepts that touched on this topic to find some more exceptions and possibly gain some interesting insights.
Concept 35 seems to contradict this concept: "Unusually small bets tend to be made either with a big hand ... or with a bluff... With one pair your opponents will usually either check or bet a larger amount." So Concept 35 suggests: Big bets mean one pair.
Concept 40 also somewhat contradicts our current concept. This one suggests: Big bets mean the board has lots of likely draws.
Concept 1: "When in doubt, bet more" suggests: Big bets imply more doubt. Or something. This concept was pretty dumb.
To be fair, several concepts do support our current concept. For example, Concept 11 said "A big bet is the most relevant and accurate information available."
Concept 39 also supports our current concept. This was the one suggesting that you respect bigger bets more than smaller ones.
Concept No. 44: The bigger a bet your opponent makes, the more of your hands that turn into bluff catchers.
As I said above in my Concept 42 analysis, I agree with this one. At least in my games, my opponents are usually smart enough not to bet a huge amount with a hand that is only moderately strong, because they know I will probably only call them with hands that are even stronger.
It occurs to me that if my opponent is especially talented, he might be able to trick me into calling with a weaker hand trying to catch his bluff, but this is a very high-risk maneuver for him if his hand is only moderately strong.
I like to think about these concepts in terms of hand ranges, when possible. When my opponent makes a big bet, his hand range is polarized: usually he'll have near the nuts, sometimes he'll have nothing. My range falls almost entirely between these two poles, so my hands are mostly bluff-catchers. When my opponent makes a small bet, it's usually with a hand that is only somewhat strong, or it could be a bluff. Many of the hands in my range will fall on either side of his value-betting range, so my hand strength is the main factor determining how I react to his bet.
Concept No. 42: If you check the river, most players will bet only with very good hands and with bluffs. They'll check down hands that could win a showdown, but that are unlikely to be called by worse hands.
Yup. This is the correct way for your opponents to play the river, and since it's rather basic and intuitive, most players have mastered this strategy. You will see players deviate from this, but it is quite rare. However, I think it is worth noting because you don't want to fall into a pattern where you pay off your opponents if they make huge bets with hands that are only moderately strong.
As Sklansky and Malmuth point out in their discussion, this fact means that a lot of your medium-strength hands become "bluff-catchers." That is, they can only win if your opponent is bluffing. For example, it doesn't matter whether you hold top pair or bottom pair if your opponent will only value bet with two pair or better. Both hands can beat only bluffs. As S+M point out in Concept 44 (which I analyze below), the bigger your opponent's river bet, the less your hand matters; for example, if your opponent is rational and makes a bet of ten times the size of the pot, a wide range of your hands become "bluff-catchers," since your opponent will probably either have the nuts or nothing. On the other hand, if your opponent bets only one-tenth of the pot, the strength of your hand is very relevant.
Concept No. 43: Big bets mean big hands. Don't make or call big bets very often with weak hands.
As uncontroversial as this concept seems, I don't think it's precisely right. Big bets can mean not only big hands; they can also mean big draws or hands worried about draws. When your opponent makes a big bet (or when you make a big bet and get called), his hand range becomes much stronger. Thus, you should only call or make big bets with hands that have the potential to beat your opponent's strong range. This means you should be calling or making big bets only with big hands or big draws.
We can look back at some earlier concepts that touched on this topic to find some more exceptions and possibly gain some interesting insights.
Concept 35 seems to contradict this concept: "Unusually small bets tend to be made either with a big hand ... or with a bluff... With one pair your opponents will usually either check or bet a larger amount." So Concept 35 suggests: Big bets mean one pair.
Concept 40 also somewhat contradicts our current concept. This one suggests: Big bets mean the board has lots of likely draws.
Concept 1: "When in doubt, bet more" suggests: Big bets imply more doubt. Or something. This concept was pretty dumb.
To be fair, several concepts do support our current concept. For example, Concept 11 said "A big bet is the most relevant and accurate information available."
Concept 39 also supports our current concept. This was the one suggesting that you respect bigger bets more than smaller ones.
Concept No. 44: The bigger a bet your opponent makes, the more of your hands that turn into bluff catchers.
As I said above in my Concept 42 analysis, I agree with this one. At least in my games, my opponents are usually smart enough not to bet a huge amount with a hand that is only moderately strong, because they know I will probably only call them with hands that are even stronger.
It occurs to me that if my opponent is especially talented, he might be able to trick me into calling with a weaker hand trying to catch his bluff, but this is a very high-risk maneuver for him if his hand is only moderately strong.
I like to think about these concepts in terms of hand ranges, when possible. When my opponent makes a big bet, his hand range is polarized: usually he'll have near the nuts, sometimes he'll have nothing. My range falls almost entirely between these two poles, so my hands are mostly bluff-catchers. When my opponent makes a small bet, it's usually with a hand that is only somewhat strong, or it could be a bluff. Many of the hands in my range will fall on either side of his value-betting range, so my hand strength is the main factor determining how I react to his bet.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Analyzing NLHE:TAP Concept 41
From No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice by David Sklansky and Ed Miller.
Concept No. 41: When holding a mediocre hand, usually bet enough (but not more) so that a raise means you are almost certainly beaten.
I don't like this one. It falls into the category of advice that stems from the idea that you should avoid putting yourself in a position of having to make a difficult decision. As I've already discussed twice before in this series of concept analyses, I don't buy into this idea. I don't think that you can generally improve your EV by maneuvering like this. However, I have heard that Chris Ferguson espouses this idea in The Full Tilt Poker Strategy Guide, which makes me worry that I might be wrong. A project I'd like to take on when I'm done with these concept analyses is to try to disprove this idea in general (or prove it, as the case may be). I'll have to take a look at what "Jesus" has to say, since he really knows what he's talking about when it comes to game theory.
Concept No. 41: When holding a mediocre hand, usually bet enough (but not more) so that a raise means you are almost certainly beaten.
I don't like this one. It falls into the category of advice that stems from the idea that you should avoid putting yourself in a position of having to make a difficult decision. As I've already discussed twice before in this series of concept analyses, I don't buy into this idea. I don't think that you can generally improve your EV by maneuvering like this. However, I have heard that Chris Ferguson espouses this idea in The Full Tilt Poker Strategy Guide, which makes me worry that I might be wrong. A project I'd like to take on when I'm done with these concept analyses is to try to disprove this idea in general (or prove it, as the case may be). I'll have to take a look at what "Jesus" has to say, since he really knows what he's talking about when it comes to game theory.
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Analyzing NLHE:TAP Concept 40
After this post, I'll be two-thirds of the way through my analysis of the sixty concepts at the end of No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice by David Sklansky and Ed Miller.
Concept No. 40: Certain flops require certain-size bets. No matter what hand you hold, your flop bets, on average, should be smaller on flops like AhKdKs than they are on flops like Jh9s7h.
I think the authors have overstated the idea here, but I still like this concept. Most players underestimate the importance of flop texture in sizing their bets, but the authors go too far when they imply that flop texture is the only factor worth considering. Also important are position, stack-sizes, number of opponents, your hand, your table image, and your opponents' tendencies. On the AKK flop, for example, the bet should usually be around 1/4 to 1/2 of the pot. Bets outside this range might sometimes be better if stack sizes are quite small or if your opponents are maniacs, but these are unusual circumstances. On the J97 flop, you should almost never bet less than 3/4 of the pot, and sometimes it will be correct to bet 3/2 of the pot.
The reasons for the different bet sizes on different flops are basically those described in the book's discussion. If you are ahead on a AKK flop, your opponents have little chance to outdraw you, and even if they do, they usually won't be able to make much more from you. They have very little implied odds and very little incentive to call a bet of over 1/4 of the pot unless they have you beat. Similarly, your bluffs should be small on this flop to cover your small value bets. On the J97 flop, however, there are all sorts of draws, meaning that your opponent could easily draw to beat your hand, and if he does, he might be able to win quite a bit more from you. Your opponents are likely to have good implied odds in this situation, and so you must bet more to discourage them from calling. Your bluffs must follow suit.
Another way to look at this is that if you have a made hand on the J97 flop, you can make large value bets without worrying about making your opponents fold, but on the AKK flop, the most you can hope to win is a small bet or two.
Concept No. 40: Certain flops require certain-size bets. No matter what hand you hold, your flop bets, on average, should be smaller on flops like AhKdKs than they are on flops like Jh9s7h.
I think the authors have overstated the idea here, but I still like this concept. Most players underestimate the importance of flop texture in sizing their bets, but the authors go too far when they imply that flop texture is the only factor worth considering. Also important are position, stack-sizes, number of opponents, your hand, your table image, and your opponents' tendencies. On the AKK flop, for example, the bet should usually be around 1/4 to 1/2 of the pot. Bets outside this range might sometimes be better if stack sizes are quite small or if your opponents are maniacs, but these are unusual circumstances. On the J97 flop, you should almost never bet less than 3/4 of the pot, and sometimes it will be correct to bet 3/2 of the pot.
The reasons for the different bet sizes on different flops are basically those described in the book's discussion. If you are ahead on a AKK flop, your opponents have little chance to outdraw you, and even if they do, they usually won't be able to make much more from you. They have very little implied odds and very little incentive to call a bet of over 1/4 of the pot unless they have you beat. Similarly, your bluffs should be small on this flop to cover your small value bets. On the J97 flop, however, there are all sorts of draws, meaning that your opponent could easily draw to beat your hand, and if he does, he might be able to win quite a bit more from you. Your opponents are likely to have good implied odds in this situation, and so you must bet more to discourage them from calling. Your bluffs must follow suit.
Another way to look at this is that if you have a made hand on the J97 flop, you can make large value bets without worrying about making your opponents fold, but on the AKK flop, the most you can hope to win is a small bet or two.
Analyzing NLHE:TAP Concept 39
From No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice by David Sklansky and Ed Miller.
Concept No. 39: You must adapt your play to different-sized bets. If you will call a twice-pot bet as often as you call a half-pot bet, you're in trouble.
This is correct both in terms of game theory and in practice. There are probably some players against whom you should not take this advice, but they are rare.
Game theory assumes that your opponents play optimally against your strategy. If you call just as often whether the bet is big or small, your opponents can easily exploit this by making their bluff bets small and their value bets big.
In both theory and practice, I think it's true that big bets are more likely to be bluffs than small bets, and this is why some people are inclined to call big bets liberally. The big bets look suspicious. However, this does not mean you can call these big bets more often, because you need to win a higher percentage of the time for you to come out ahead. The fact is that you have to let yourself be bluffed once in a while, especially when your opponent makes a big bet.
As I said, there are probably some players against whom you should call big bets even more liberally than small bets. This situation can arise if you notice that your opponent always makes small value bets but his big bets tend to be bluffs. You still need to be wary, though, because players are liable to change their strategy at any time!
Concept No. 39: You must adapt your play to different-sized bets. If you will call a twice-pot bet as often as you call a half-pot bet, you're in trouble.
This is correct both in terms of game theory and in practice. There are probably some players against whom you should not take this advice, but they are rare.
Game theory assumes that your opponents play optimally against your strategy. If you call just as often whether the bet is big or small, your opponents can easily exploit this by making their bluff bets small and their value bets big.
In both theory and practice, I think it's true that big bets are more likely to be bluffs than small bets, and this is why some people are inclined to call big bets liberally. The big bets look suspicious. However, this does not mean you can call these big bets more often, because you need to win a higher percentage of the time for you to come out ahead. The fact is that you have to let yourself be bluffed once in a while, especially when your opponent makes a big bet.
As I said, there are probably some players against whom you should call big bets even more liberally than small bets. This situation can arise if you notice that your opponent always makes small value bets but his big bets tend to be bluffs. You still need to be wary, though, because players are liable to change their strategy at any time!
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Analyzing NLHE:TAP Concept 38
From No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice by David Sklansky and Ed Miller.
Concept No. 38: Be more apt to semi-bluff when your draw isn't to the nuts than when it is.
Yes. This was discussed indirectly in my analysis of Concept 34. The key point there was "the higher implied odds your draw has, the less attractive semibluffing with it becomes."A draw to the nuts has much better implied odds when it hits than does a non-nut draw, which makes checking or calling with it a more attractive option relative to semibluffing.
Put another way, semibluffing will often win the hand immediately when your opponent folds. This is the ideal result regardless of whether your draw is to the nuts, but it's more beneficial if your draw has meager implied odds. Nut draws usually have strong implied odds, so they are commonly worth just calling with.
As an aside, when semibluffing with a non-nut draw, I try to bet enough to make better draws consider folding. For example, if I have 8h7h and the flop is Ah6h5c, I will make sure to offer my opponent significantly worse than 2-to-1 odds. This way, someone with a better flush draw will have to consider folding, because if I have a pair of aces or better, calling would be incorrect for him.
Concept No. 38: Be more apt to semi-bluff when your draw isn't to the nuts than when it is.
Yes. This was discussed indirectly in my analysis of Concept 34. The key point there was "the higher implied odds your draw has, the less attractive semibluffing with it becomes."A draw to the nuts has much better implied odds when it hits than does a non-nut draw, which makes checking or calling with it a more attractive option relative to semibluffing.
Put another way, semibluffing will often win the hand immediately when your opponent folds. This is the ideal result regardless of whether your draw is to the nuts, but it's more beneficial if your draw has meager implied odds. Nut draws usually have strong implied odds, so they are commonly worth just calling with.
As an aside, when semibluffing with a non-nut draw, I try to bet enough to make better draws consider folding. For example, if I have 8h7h and the flop is Ah6h5c, I will make sure to offer my opponent significantly worse than 2-to-1 odds. This way, someone with a better flush draw will have to consider folding, because if I have a pair of aces or better, calling would be incorrect for him.
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